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The importance of foodborne viral infections is increas-
ingly recognized. Food handlers can transmit infection dur-
ing preparation or serving; fruit and vegetables may be con-
taminated by fecally contaminated water used for growing
or washing. And  the globalization of the food industry
mean that a contaminated food item may not be limited to
national distribution. International outbreaks do occur, but
little data are available about the incidence of such events
and the food items associated with the highest risks. We
developed a combined research and surveillance program
for enteric viruses involving 12 laboratories in 9 European
countries. This project aims to gain insight into the epidemi-
ology of enteric viruses in Europe and the role of food in
transmission by harmonizing (i.e., assessing the compara-
bility of data through studies of molecular detection tech-
niques) and enhancing epidemiologic surveillance. We
describe the setup and preliminary results of our system,
which uses a Web-accessible central database to track
viruses and provides the foundation for an early warning
system of foodborne and other common-source outbreaks. 
Food-related illness is common worldwide, and bacteri-al pathogens have historically been associated with this
mode of transmission. In recent years, however, the cause
of most outbreaks of foodborne illness remained unknown,
although a significant proportion were presumed to be
viral (1). Additional research established the importance of
viruses, especially the human caliciviruses belonging to
the genus Norovirus (NV) (2). Transmission of these virus-
es is primarily from person to person, but numerous exam-
ples illustrate that NV are efficiently transmitted in food,
water, or contaminated environmental surfaces. NV simi-
lar to, but not identical with, human strains have been
found in cattle and in pigs (3,4). Studies in which viruses
were molecularly characterized have shown that numerous
variants co-circulate in the community but that occasional-
ly shifts occur in which a single variant dominates over a
wide geographic region (5). In 1995 to 1996, a worldwide
epidemic was observed (6). The mechanism of emergence
of these variants is unclear, but one hypothesis is that they
represent widespread common-source events. 
While it is clear that enteric viral infections are com-
mon, far less established is how common the foodborne
mode of transmission is and how important it is in the epi-
demiology of these viruses. The challenge lies not so much
in detecting outbreaks related to foodborne contamination
at the end of the chain (the food handler in the nursing
home or restaurant), because those are likely to be detect-
ed by routine outbreak investigation, with or without
molecular typing. Linking NV outbreaks to common-
source introductions nationally or internationally may be
more difficult because of the high secondary attack rate
that results from rapid person-to-person transmission.
Thus, an initial seeding event will rapidly be masked by
the occurrence of new cases or outbreaks, suggesting that
person-to-person transmission is the primary mode of
spread. The likelihood of detecting such seeding events
relies on effective surveillance, which combines epidemi-
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ologic assessment of the outbreak and molecular typing to
discover and track potential links between outbreaks. Such
molecular tracing, however, requires knowledge on diver-
sity of “resident viruses” in the region under study to be
able to recognize unusual increases. Therefore, we estab-
lished a combined research and surveillance network for
foodborne viruses that was granted by the European
Commission. This project group combines complementary
expertise from the fields of diagnostic virology, molecular
virology, epidemiology, and food microbiology to study
modes of transmission of NV across Europe. Mapping
these pathways allows better founded estimates of the pro-
portion of illness that may be attributed to foodborne trans-
mission and identification of high-risk foods, processing
methods, or import and transport routes, which subsequent-
ly can be a focus of prevention programs. The data are
important for assessing the risks associated with consump-
tion of certain food items. Essential to the success of this
project is the establishment of a common, central database,
which is now used by all partners to compare data across
Europe as soon as they are available. We describe this proj-
ect and results from its first 18 months of operation.
Materials and Methods
The network is a collaboration among 12 laboratories in
9 countries in Europe to allow more rapid and internation-
ally harmonized assessment of the spread of foodborne
viral pathogens. The project is coordinated by the National
Institute of Public Health and the Environment in
Bilthoven, the Netherlands. Participants are virologists and
epidemiologists with active research programs in (food-
borne) enteric viruses from Spain (Barcelona, Valencia,
Madrid), Italy (Rome), France (Nantes, Dijon), Germany
(Berlin), the Netherlands (Bilthoven), the United Kingdom
(London), Denmark (Copenhagen), Sweden (Solna), and
Finland (Helsinki). In addition, groups from Slovenia and
Hungary participate. 
The overall objectives for the complete study are as fol-
lows: 1) to develop novel, standardized, rapid methods for
detection and typing of enteric viruses, particularly NV, to
be used in all participating laboratories; 2) to establish the
framework for a rapid, prepublication exchange of epi-
demiologic, virologic, and molecular diagnostic data; 3) to
study the importance of enteric viruses as causes of illness
across Europe, with a special focus on multinational out-
breaks of infection with NV and hepatitis A virus; 4) to
provide better estimates for the proportion of NV infec-
tions that can be attributed to foodborne infection; 5) to
determine high-risk foods and transmission routes of food-
borne viral infections in the different countries and
between countries; 6) to describe the pattern of diversity of
NV within and between countries and identify potential
pandemic strains at the onset; and 7) to investigate the
mechanisms of emergence of these strains, including the
possibility of spillover from animal reservoirs
The central research goal is to better understand the
mechanisms of emergence of variant NV strains. We
hypothesized that the observed epidemic shifts might be
caused by displacement of endemic variants attributable to
a large seeding event with a variant that subsequently
spread through the population by secondary and tertiary
waves of transmission, or possibly by a smaller seeding
event of a highly transmissible new variant, generated by
genetic mutation or recombination. To address these ques-
tions, we built a European surveillance structure for out-
breaks of viral gastroenteritis, including food- or water-
borne outbreaks. The first phase of the project, described
in this report, was designed to review existing surveillance
systems for viral gastroenteritis, to design and agree on a
minimum dataset for collection during the second phase of
the project; to review and evaluate currently used methods
for detection and genotyping of NV with the aim of harmo-
nizing methods for virus detection in gastroenteritis out-
breaks; and to build a database of combined epidemiolog-
ic and virologic data for use by all participants. The over-
riding aim was to facilitate the early detection of potential-
ly emerging variant strains. Upon completion of this phase,
we will begin “ enhanced surveillance”, i.e., harmonized
surveillance for viral gastroenteritis outbreaks to study
objectives 4–7.
Results
Review of Current Methods in Europe
From the outset, it was recognized that the best
approach in developing an international surveillance
scheme for foodborne viruses would not be the standardi-
zation of practice, but rather the harmonization of existing
practices. To achieve this, a number of surveys were
undertaken to determine diagnostic capabilities, genotyp-
ing techniques, and the status of surveillance of viral gas-
troenteritis outbreaks among project participants. The
results of these surveys are highlighted below. 
Virus Detection and Genotyping 
The scale of diagnostic capability in laboratories varies
widely, and a range of diagnostic tests (electron
microscopy, reverse transcription–polymerase chain reac-
tion [RT-PCR], and enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay)
and characterization methods are used (including het-
eroduplex mobility assay, reverse line blot, microplate
hybridization, and sequencing (7–9). Laboratories in all
countries now use molecular techniques (RT-PCR) for NV
detection (10). 
A comparative evaluation of RT-PCR assays was done
by analysis of a coded panel of stool samples that had test-
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ed positive (81 samples) or negative (9 samples) for NV.
Samples provided by four laboratories were included, as
well as a samples representing the currently known diver-
sity of NV genotypes. Full details of this study have been
published (11). This evaluation showed that no single
assay is best, although sensitivities range from 55% to
100%. Most differences were seen when comparing assay
sensitivities by genogroup. Based on pre-set scoring crite-
ria (sensitivity, specificity, assay format, length of
sequence), one primer combination was ranked as the
assay of first choice for laboratories starting surveillance,
and protocols and reagents have been made available to all
participants on request. 
On the basis of the aggregated data from the sequence
database, alignments were made of the regions in the viral
RNA that contain the primer-binding sites for the set of
primers with the highest ranking for the diagnostic evalu-
ation to generate more optimal designs of primers (12).
These primers, protocols, and reference reagents have
been made available to several groups in the field.
Outbreak Investigations
While all countries in the network now have the diag-
nostic capability to recognize outbreaks of NV, the struc-
ture of their national surveillance differs and therefore, so
do the epidemiologic data collected on viral gastroenteritis
(10,13). Some countries investigate outbreaks of gastroen-
teritis irrespective of the size or possible mode of transmis-
sion (United Kingdom, the Netherlands); others primarily
investigate outbreaks that appear as foodborne from the
onset (Denmark, France) (10). Similarly, coverage of the
laboratories involved ranges from regional (Italy) to
national, although different levels of underreporting are
likely to exist (10) These differences, as well as differences
in the laboratory test protocols, will be taken into consid-
eration when interpreting aggregated data in the later
stages of the project. For the purposes of comparing data
across Europe, however, the key finding was that most
countries maintain a national database of NV outbreaks (as
opposed to individual cases). Although the proportion of
the population that these databases effectively survey and
the completeness of clinical information collected vary, we
recognized that we could network national outbreak sur-
veillance by agreeing on a minimum dataset. That dataset
would include the causative organism, mode and place of
transmission, diagnostic results, case details, food vehi-
cles, and viral typing information. 
Also agreed upon were clinical definitions of a case and
an outbreak of viral gastroenteritis based on Kaplan’s cri-
teria (14), as follows. A case of gastroenteritis was defined
as a person seen with 1) vomiting (two or more episodes of
vomiting in a 12-hour period lasting >12 hours), or 2) diar-
rhea (two or more loose stools in a 12-hour period lasting
>12 hours, or 3) vomiting as defined in 1) and diarrhea as
defined in 2). An outbreak was defined as follows: 1)
Patients living in more than one private residence or resi-
dent or working in an institution at the time of exposure; 2)
cases linked by time and place; 3) vomiting in >50% of
total cases (14); 4) mean or median duration of illness of
total cases from 12 to 60 hours; 5) incubation period (if
available) of total cases between 15 and 77 hours, usually
24–48 hours (14,15); and 6) testing of stool specimens for
bacterial pathogens. (This step is not mandatory;, howev-
er, if tested, all specimens should be negative for bacterial
pathogens.) 
Development of Database
A major goal of the first year was to build a database
into which historic information present in the participating
institutes would be collected. The rationale behind this was
that by combining this existing information, new observa-
tions (on seasonality of outbreaks or patterns of emergence
of new variants, for example) might be possible. Without
harmonization of data collection, the comparative analysis
would clearly be limited. The historic database, however,
also served as a pilot phase because the definitive format
of the database is used in the enhanced surveillance pro-
gram. Participants who had historic collections of
sequences were asked to submit these, along with addition-
al epidemiologic information, as described in Table 1. Data
were entered by using the Bionumerics (BN) package
(Applied Maths, Ghent, Belgium), which allows storage,
comparative analysis, and clustering of combined epidemi-
ologic and biological experimental data (e.g., sequences,
reverse line blot results, enzyme immunoassay data). The
entries were either uploaded from the public domain or
submitted as unpublished sequences from participating
laboratories. Publicly available sequences were included to
provide a customized report for database searches, e.g.,
genotype to which the sequence belongs. 
Since September 2001, participants have been
able to access the database directly through a password-
controlled Internet connection. At present, the database
contains >2,500 entries, mostly on NV, but including some
hepatitis A virus, astrovirus, and Sapovirus (Tables 2 and
3). Upcoming variants will first be subjected to a search of
the historic database to determine if the viruses have been
seen before in Europe. An automated search tool is avail-
able and has been made accessible through the Internet to
participants. Partners interested in analyzing the data can
obtain the complete dataset, provided they adhere to the
confidentiality agreements signed by every partner.
Interested parties outside the project group can access the
database under certain conditions through the coordinator
or one of the participants. This access is not restricted to
groups in the participating countries. The limiting factor is
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the target region used for virus characterization, which has
not been standardized globally. A database search will be
performed upon request (for groups outside the network).
Results are then communicated to them and to the person
who submitted any matching sequences. After that initial
linking, follow-up discussions and investigations of possi-
ble common-source events can be done by the groups
involved. 
Prospective Enhanced Surveillance
Comparative Evaluation of 
Diagnostic/Genotyping Methods
The different PCR primers used among the European
group all target a highly conserved region within the viral
polymerase gene. Sequences of the amplicons from the
various diagnostic PCRs overlap and therefore, can be
compared to gain inferences on the molecular epidemiolo-
gy and the spread of NV variants (11). Rapid characteriza-
tion techniques, notably the reverse line blot (9) and het-
eroduplex mobility assay (7), are also used within the net-
work; the typing data generated by these techniques can
also be accommodated by the database. 
Comparative Evaluation of Data
After agreement on a minimum epidemiologic and
virologic dataset, we made a standard Web-based question-
naire available to all participants behind a password-pro-
tected site (available from: URL: www.eufoodbornevirus-
es.net). Using Web-based Active Server Pages (ASP) tech-
nology, investigators have full access to the secure out-
break database (Figure). Investigators are asked to enter
information that is available as soon as an investigation
begins or an event occurs that meets the outbreak defini-
tion. A unique reference number is assigned to each out-
break, which is the key used to access records and to
update diagnostic or typing data, as an investigation con-
tinues. 
The database also collects information on the level of
evidence (i.e., microbiologic, epidemiologic, circumstan-
tial) implicating food or water as a mode of transmission.
Pop-up windows are used to define these criteria, since a
range of public health scientists use the system. Other fea-
tures of the ASP technology, including drop-down menus,
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Table 1. Requested data fields for entries of viral sequences in 
the historic databasea 
Field name Field type Mandatory field 
Country A Yes 
Institute A Yes 
Reference no. A Yes 
Type of virus (NV, SV, HAV, 
ASV, HEV 
N Yes 
Sequence identifier (e.g., 
GenBank accession no.) 
A No 
Method no. N No 
Genotype/subtype N No 
Sequence pol region /VP1/2a A Yes  
Sequence capsid region A  
Source of isolate (human, calf, 
swine, environmental, other) 
N Yes 
Specimen N No 
Epidemiology N No 
Vehicle (food, water, person-to-
person, zoonotic, not known) 
N No 
National region A No 
Date of receipt in reference 
laboratory 
D Yes 
Age N No 
Sex N No 
Travel associated N No 
Travel destination A No 
aNV, Norovirus; SV, Sapovirus; ASV, astrovirus; HAV, hepatitis A virus; HEV, 
hepatitis E virus; A, letters and numbers; B, numbers; D, data. 
 
Table 2. Number of entries in the database by year of detection for selected viruses, as determined by reverse line blot typing (RLB)a 
 
N HAV SLV ASV NLV 
NLV 
capsid NLV pol 
NLV cap 
and pol RLB Animal 
Not dated 364 69 4 7 284 152 119 9 1 2 
1989 and before 102 68 2 - 32 15  23  7   
1990 43 31 1 - 11 7 10 6   
1991 5 - - - 5 2 5 2   
1992 11 - 2 - 9 3 7 3   
1993 21 - 2 - 19 14 26 11   
1994 45 - 1 - 44 20 38 14   
1995 49 - - 2 47 15 41 9   
1996 122 - 1 4 117 18 100 2   
1997 122 - - 1 121 8 117 5 3 6 
1998 158 - 2 6 152 19 130 11 6 13 
1999 531 44 2 26 485 39 366 32 129 7 
2000 446 40 2 - 404 61 380 41 26 6 
2001 419 5 2 2 410 52 396 52 - - 
2002 155 - - - 745 22 742 15 -  
aHAV, hepatitis A virus; SLV, Sapporo-like virus; ASV, astrovirus; NLV, Norwalk-like viruses. 
are used to standardize the data collected. Descriptive
information from outbreaks (number of people exposed,
number of people ill, number of controls infected, symp-
toms) is collected when possible, to allow comparisons of
the clinical characteristics of different NV genotypes.
Preliminary data suggest that such differences exist.
One of our main scientific objectives is to explain the
mechanism behind the emergence of new variant strains.
Essential for the early detection of such emerging variants
is a rapid reporting network. The initial suspicion of
“something strange” may be from clinicians who investi-
gate outbreaks (e.g., a sudden increase in the number of
reports), or from one of the laboratories (e.g., finding the
same variant in several outbreaks). The central database is
used to facilitate both types of reports. The real power in
this format of data exchange is that immediately after
entry or update of information, the data are in the database
and can be accessed by other collaborators. The database
can be searched for common virologic (sequence) or epi-
demiologic (e.g., a food vehicle) characteristics that
would trigger further investigation of links between out-
breaks.
Recognition of International Outbreaks
This model has proved successful in recognizing a
number of internationally linked events. Clusters of cases
in Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands were all linked
to oysters imported from France. Another foodborne out-
break traced in part through the network followed the con-
cluding dinner of an international conference in Finland.
Symptoms began the day after the conference, when many
attendees had returned to their home countries.
Approximately 40 persons were affected, and the same NV
variant was detected from cases in Finland, Sweden, and
the Netherlands. A dessert item was implicated by cohort
study. Importations of hepatitis A from Peru into Spain and
from Ibiza, Spain, to Germany have also been recognized
through the network. Full details of these outbreaks will be
published elsewhere.
Discussion
Microbial food safety is considered an important public
heath issue but historically has focused on control of bac-
terial contamination. Several recent publications, however,
show that outbreaks of foodborne infection attributable to
viruses are common and may in fact be an important pub-
lic health concern for several reasons: most clinical labora-
tories involved in outbreak investigations do not have
access to routine diagnostic methods for detecting NV,
user-friendly methods for use in these laboratories are only
now becoming available and need to be validated, food-
borne transmission of NV is quite common, and food
microbial quality control largely relies on indicators for the
presence of fecal bacteria, which may not correlate with
the presence of enteric viruses (2,16). Although foodborne
viruses are increasingly studied, no validated methods yet
exist for reliably detecting them in food items. In all, these
facts indicate that through foodborne transmission an
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entries HAV ASV NLV SLV 
Argentina 9   10  
Australia  17   17  
Canada 20   20  
Switzerland 23   23  
Czech Republic 1 1    
Germany  167 1  432  
Hungary 93   93  
Denmark 67   67  
Spain  33 18  102  
Finland 90   130  
France 216  24 203 7 
Great Britain 509 1  566 3 
Ghana 2   2  
Hong Kong  7   7  
Japan 363   388 3 
Korea 1   1  
Mexico 1   1  
Netherlands 743 87 24 707  
Norway 13   13  
New Zealand 5   5  
Russia 8   8  
South Africa 9   5 4 
Sweden 101   100 1 
Turkey 1 1    
United States 67 6  59 2 
aHAV, hepatitis A virus; ASV, astrovirus; NLV, Norwalk-like viruses; SLV, 
Sapporo-like virus. 
Figure. Timeline of Web-based reporting of epidemiologic and
virologic data and interrogation of the database for the Foodborne
Viruses in Europe Group. 
enteric viral pathogen (NV) can escape detection, possibly
resulting in large epidemics. 
In the United States, molecular detection techniques are
being implemented in state public health laboratories
under the guidance of the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), which is building an infrastructure for
reporting of outbreaks of food-related illness attributable
to enteric viruses (Calicinet). In Europe, no central insti-
tute yet exists with the authority to do this, so the best
efforts to date are the voluntary disease-specific surveil-
lance networks, such as Enternet (which monitors trends in
foodborne bacterial pathogens), and the European
Influenza Surveillance Scheme (designed to monitor
influenza virus activity across Europe) (17,18). We have
built such a surveillance network for enteric viruses, using
NV as a target organism. NV was an obvious choice: an
increasing number of publications illustrate that it is one of
the most important causes of outbreaks of gastroenteritis,
including food- and water-related outbreaks (reviewed in
2). CDC estimates that up to 66% of all food-related illness
in the United States may be due to NV (19). From a com-
munity-based case-control study in the Netherlands, risk-
factor analysis for NV, based on information collected
throughout a 1-year cohort study, suggested an association
between NV and a complex score that was used as a proxy
for food-handling hygiene. On the basis of this approach,
an estimated 12% to 15% of community-acquired illness
may be due to food- or waterborne modes of transmission
(with 85% attributed to contact with a symptomatic person
in or outside the household) (de Wit et al., unpub. data).
The proportion of foodborne outbreaks reported in the
countries participating in our network ranges from 7% to
100%, but that range merely reflects the differences in the
selections used in the different surveillance systems and
cannot be used to estimate the true impact of foodborne ill-
ness caused by NV (10). While definitive data still need to
be collected, the consensus is that NV is an important
cause of food-related infection and disease. 
Foodborne transmission of viral gastroenteritis has not
historically been acknowledged as a public health priority,
which means that our surveillance system is inevitably
restricted to groups that already have an active program in
the field. Ideally, we would like to build a network of
national institutes represented by both epidemiologists and
microbiologists involved in outbreaks of viral gastroenteri-
tis; however, at present this ideal is not possible for all of
Europe. By networking the existing information, assessing
comparability of data through studies of primers and pro-
tocols used, and examining data from current surveillance,
we hope to be able to paint a bigger picture from the frag-
mented information that is available. 
The standardized outbreak questionnaire, accessible
through the Internet, is designed to collect a minimum
dataset about all outbreaks. However, participants who
perform more detailed epidemiologic or virologic investi-
gations can also submit additional data. The minimum
dataset will suffice to answer the basic questions for the
surveillance, i.e., what is the reported incidence of NV out-
breaks across Europe, and which proportion is considered
to be due to food- or waterborne transmission. 
A key feature of any disease surveillance system is its
use as an early-warning tool, in this case for international
common-source outbreaks. To facilitate this, several fea-
tures were included in our database setup. Information on
outbreaks can be updated with new information as it comes
in, to avoid piling up information until the outbreak inves-
tigation has been completed (which may be months later).
Both the epidemiologic data and laboratory data (mostly
sequences) can be searched easily. Thus, participants can
be alerted to similarities in disease profiles (e.g., outbreaks
with imported fruits) or in sequences. Either signal can
lead to contacts between participants to discuss possible
indications for a joint investigation. Crucial in this discus-
sion was the issue of confidentiality, both for patient and
product information, and for data from investigations. The
present modus operandi is that each participant signs a
confidentiality agreement, which states that data submitted
to the database are owned by the person submitting them
(subject to each participant’s national regulations on
patient and laboratory data); specific patient and product
information is not entered into the database. If necessary
for outbreak investigations, the groups involved will
decide on a case-by-case basis what information may or
may not be used by the consortium. Participants can obtain
the complete information from the database for their own
analysis, or choose to use it as a search tool and rely on the
analysis done by a scientist employed on this aspect of the
database, who is stationed in Bilthoven, the Netherlands.
So far, five international outbreaks have been detected
because of the network. 
The food distribution chain in Europe is complex, and
therefore the transmission of viruses across borders can
occur by means of contaminated food. The surveillance
network described here allows early detection of interna-
tional common-source outbreaks of foodborne viruses.
Most of the work to date has involved harmonization of
methods for investigating outbreaks and detecting the
viruses causing these outbreaks, as well as the develop-
ment of a database system that facilitates the exchange of
information between laboratories and institutes involved in
viral gastroenteritis research and surveillance. The sys-
tem’s strength is that it combines basic epidemiologic and
laboratory data into a searchable repository. This network
has demonstrated its potential to recognize transnational
outbreaks. However, the network is inherently limited by
the quality of data available at the national level, which is
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a reflection of the priority given to foodborne viruses. At
present, we are undertaking a 2-year enhanced surveillance
project to study the frequency and modes of transmission
of viral gastroenteritis outbreaks across Europe. 
Core funding for this project was obtained from the
European Union under the 5th framework program, contract no
QLK1-1999-C-00594. 
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